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The North China Incident 1937

The campaign to pacify North China and capture Peiping and Tientsin

New Version!

By John H. Ebert

Japanese troops advances on Peking

July 1937.

On the night of July 7th a unit from a Japanese garrison in North China clashed with Chinese forces guarding the walled village of Wanping, several miles from Peiping. In addition to its proximity to the ancient capital, Wanping was also a strategic point overlooking the important rail link known as the Marco Polo Bridge.

Though the Japanese were entirely within their treaty rights (as stipulated by the Boxer Protocol of 1901) to both be in Peiping and conduct exercises at night, their frequent comings and goings and overall arrogance was seen as especially irritating to the Chinese. Exactly what they were doing that night, or whether the exercises were entirely necessary, are issues debated even now. The exact cause and chronology of this clash are not authoritatively written anywhere; conflicting, biased, and entirely unverifiable accounts are available from a wide variety of Japanese, Chinese, and western sources.

Just who fired the first shot, and why, will forever be in dispute, though this fact is not nearly as important as the string of unremarkable misunderstandings that repeatedly exploded into full blown firefights after the initial exchange.

Between the first incident at Marco Polo Bridge, and what was to become a general mobilization of Japanese troops into North China, nearly three weeks of negotiations, hand wringing, brinksmanship, bad timing, and misunderstandings on both sides would pass before hostilities openly commenced.

On July 9th, the question of how Japan was to respond was debated in an emergency cabinet meeting. Though War Minister Sugiyama believed sending three divisions to North China would quiet things down, Foreign Minister Koki Hirota's view, that the incident should be 'settled locally', prevailed that day. (a 'local settlement' was a battlefield agreement between belligerants in a specific locality, and did not involve direct government to government negotiations)

Though talks were underway in accordance with this policy, another firefight broke out on the 10th, supposedly sparked accidentally by firecrackers going off in Wanping. Despite events like this, a settlement was eventually negotiated in large measure due to the personal intervention of both General Hashimoto and Sung Chi-yuen, commander of the 29th Corp and all Chinese troops in North China.

The agreement, proposed by the Japanese and largely accepted by the Chinese 29th Army, involved punishing those Chinese deemed responsible for killing a Japanese soldier, taking steps to ensure similar incidents were prevented, toning down the rhetoric of anti-Japanese organizations, and force pull-backs. Sung and Hashimoto began carrying out the plan, and all seemed quiet...

Despite the personal friendship between Hashimoto and Sung and the agreement they insisted upon, neither commander was able to prevent inflexible or careless leaders on his respective side from creating the appearance of disregard for the delicate truce. The region's poor communications infrastructure made updates from China infrequent and delayed, which caused members of Prime Minister Konoye's cabinet to worry about the apparent lack of progress in negotiations.

On July 20th, in another cabinet meeting, Navy Minister Yonai and Foreign Minister Hirota again quashed War Minister Sugiyama's plan to send troops to China, but before the day was out a report came in saying that Japanese troops were fired upon yet again. That evening it was decided to "prepare" to mobilize three divisions, and let the Chinese not-so-subtly know that these "preparations" were taking place in an effort to "push" them closer to a local settlement. Several ministers threatened resignation upon hearing the news of mobilization, though plans were made to allow for their recall if the sitatuation improved.

The timing and content of announcements out of Tokyo, North China, and Nanking began to seem contradictory and disingenuous. Upon hearing what China deemed as Japan's "threat" to send additional troops into China, Chiang Kai-shek gave his own "on the brink" speech at a meeting of business leaders, and made sure leaders in Tokyo heard it, too. The position of the hard liners was hardened further still.

In a surprising bit of good news, On July 22nd, Japanese forces in North China reported that the reinforcements were not necessary on account of lower tensions in the area. Unfortunately, two more 'indicents' on the night of the 25th destroyed what little goodwill remained between the two governments, and actual mobilization of the three divisions was ordered in Tokyo. The Chinese 29th Army reinforced itself as best it could, and declared an "all-out battle of resistance." All bets were off as open hostilities commenced with the Japanese bombing of Langfang on July 26th...




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